GnosisDAO approved GIP-151 on June 27, 2026, authorizing GNO holders to surrender tokens for a proportional share of the DAO's liquid assets, a pool CryptoSlate estimates at roughly $109M after excluding GNO-related positions from the roughly $228M treasury.
The vote turns a governance token into something closer to an enforceable balance-sheet claim. Holders approved a one-time redemption mechanism that lets them submit GNO and receive their pro-rata share of liquid holdings. That creates a precedent for activist crypto funds that buy DAO tokens below net asset value and pressure treasuries for redemptions.
What GNO holders approved
The treasury's liquid base consists of about $68M in major external assets and $22M in stablecoins. The remaining $117M in own-token exposure sits outside the redemption pool.
The vote does not set an implementation date. The exact redemption process, including minimum amounts, redemption window and smart contract mechanics, still requires a separate execution step.
Vote cleared 215% of quorum
The vote cleared quorum with room to spare. Forty-nine addresses committed roughly 161,250 GNO in favor, equal to 215% of the 75,000-GNO minimum threshold, per CryptoSlate's analysis. At the time of the GIP-151 vote, the same source estimated treasury value at roughly $115 per GNO against a market price of approximately $104 to $106.
GIP-151 followed failed GIP-150 vote
GIP-151 was the second attempt after its predecessor failed by a wide margin. GIP-150, the earlier redemption proposal, ran from May 25 to June 1, 2026, and was rejected 71.86% to 27.86%, with 432,545 GNO voting against across a 601,848-GNO turnout and 95 unique voters.
At that time, CryptoSlate reported the estimated redemption value near $170 per GNO against a $132 market price, a 27% discount. GIP-151, reframed as a "buyback and make whole" mechanism, restructured the proposal and cleared quorum where GIP-150 did not.
DAO treasury precedent
The structural precedent is what will draw attention beyond Gnosis holders. A token-holder majority voted to convert a governance right into a direct claim on the treasury.
DAO governance has faced structural criticism for years. Ali Yahya of a16z told Fortune in June 2026 that the industry has "spent the last 10 years rediscovering the hard way that direct democracy is a bad idea." GIP-151 shows one use of that structure its critics may not have anticipated: a majority vote to enforce a balance-sheet claim rather than govern a protocol.